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Implementing Cross-Cutting Policy in
New Zealand: Health and Safety
for Aircraft in Operation
Nick Matsas
Cross-cutting policy issues have been defined as issues
‘involving or affecting the work of more than one
agency or sector’ (Review of the Centre Advisory
Group, 2001). It has not always been straightforward
to make progress with these types of issues, partly
because of the artificial boundaries created by legislative
regimes, budget vote structures, agency administrative
structures and differences in professional paradigms and
boundaries. One method of implementing cross-
cutting policy that has been used in New Zealand is to
designate an agency to administer a statute for a
particular sector, where the act is normally administered
by another agency. An example of this is the designation
of the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA)
to administer the Health and Safety in Employment
Act 1992 (HSE Act) for ‘aircraft in operation’.
A case study by the author (Matsas, 2005) of the CAA’s
implementation of the HSE Act for aircraft in operation
indicates that:
• it is difficult to design a perfect implementation
structure when applying law across agencies and sectors
where the relevant expertise to administer the law
competently and safely resides in different agencies;
• bottom-up implementation processes such as
negotiation are essential to achieve cross-cutting
policy objectives in the cross-cutting implementation
environment;
• a skilful performance on the part of the
implementing officials is essential to achieve cross-
cutting policy outcomes; and
• agencies implementing cross-cutting policy need to
evolve to accommodate the new policy objectives
they pick up through mechanisms such as agency
designation.
This article will look at the background to this policy
issue, and discuss these factors in more detail.
Occupational health and safety in
aviation – the policy problem and
proposed solutions
The issue of occupational health and safety for transport
workers has been discussed for some time. The landmark
Robens Committee in the United Kingdom in the early
1970s expressed some irritation at transport workers
being excluded from the terms of reference of their
review of the British occupational health and safety
system, because of the ‘many obvious connections
between safety and health at work, public safety,
transport safety and environmental pollution’. (Robens
et al., 1972, p.xiv). They nevertheless noted in their
conclusions that occupational health and safety and
transport safety regimes should be kept separate.
In New Zealand, the 1988 Advisory Committee on
Occupational Safety and Health recommended that all
workers be covered by occupational health and safety
legislation (ACOSH, 1988). However, due to a
concurrent review of the civil aviation system and the
enactment of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, crew on
aircraft were excluded from both the 1989 Health and
Safety at Work Bill and the Health and Safety in
Employment Act 1992.
The policy problem was that although aviation safety
legislation covered the safety of the aircraft, it did not
give the employers of aircrew a legal duty to protect
them from harm that was not directly related to the
safety of the aircraft. Aviation workers’ unions were
concerned that aircrew could experience poorer health
and safety outcomes because of the lack of legal duties
of obligation on their employers.
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The government acknowledged this in 1997, in its
response to a select committee inquiry into the
administration of the HSE (Department of Labour,
1997). The response stated that ‘the Government notes
that the basic issue is that flight attendants and other
aircrew do not have the same rights and obligations as
other employees in New Zealand, and that their
employers do not have the same responsibilities as other
employers in respect to occupational safety and health’.
Following this, the Department of Labour sought a
solution to the problem. Initial options included
administrative solutions and statute amendment.
Administrative solutions were quickly discarded, as they
had been tried unsuccessfully in the period following
the commencement of the HSE Act. At that time the
government requested the CAA to include occupational
health and safety requirements in civil aviation rules,
but did not amend the Civil Aviation Act 1990 to make
such additions to the rules legal. As a result, no additions
to rules were made.
The only remaining option was to amend existing law.
Most of the debate between 1997 and 2001 centred
on whether the Civil Aviation Act 1990 or the HSE
Act should be amended, whether the Department of
Labour or the Civil Aviation Authority should
administer the requirements, and which agency should
provide support.
The issue of expertise was also considered. The
Department of Labour had expertise in occupational
health and safety, but not in aviation safety. Aviation
industry representatives were concerned that if the
Department of Labour were the agency administering
health and safety law for aircrew, they would not
understand aviation in general, or the links with the
existing aviation safety system. The CAA likewise did
not have expertise in occupational health and safety,
and aviation unions were concerned that, if the CAA
were the lead agency, health and safety issues for groups
such as flight attendants would not be treated as
seriously as overall flight safety.
The proposed structure that emerged following the
consultation period involved an amendment of the
HSE Act to include aircrew, to be administered by the
Department of Labour with expert assistance from the
CAA. The Minister of Labour introduced the Health
and Safety in Employment Amendment Bill in
Parliament in 2001. A memorandum of understanding
was drafted between the Department of Labour and
the CAA for the provision of expert advice on aviation
to the Department of Labour.
This implementation structure was changed after the
Amendment Bill was introduced into Parliament. The
new bill also repealed parts of the Maritime Safety Act
that replicated HSE Act provisions. To allow the
Maritime Safety Authority (now Maritime New
Zealand) to retain their occupational health and safety
role on ships, a new Cabinet paper recommended an
‘Agency Designation’ option, whereby Maritime New
Zealand could be designated to administer the HSE Act
for ships. Agency designation essentially gave the
designated agencies’ chief executives the same powers
under the HSE Act as the Secretary of Labour, but only
for that agency’s specific area of expertise. It was not
long before aviation sector stakeholders recommended
that the designation option also apply to the CAA, and
this became the final recommendation of the select
committee considering the legislation.
The final result of this process was that Parliament
passed an amendment to the HSE Act in December
2002 to include aircrew, and the Prime Minister
designated the CAA to administer the HSE Act for
‘aircraft in operation’ in May 2003. Dedicated funding
was provided to the CAA for their HSE Act role, and
two experienced health and safety inspectors were
seconded to assist with the implementation.
The achievements of the policy process
The policy process achieved some essential outcomes.
Legislation was passed that placed new requirements
on aviation employers in terms of health and safety
practice. A government agency was made responsible
and accountable for implementing the new law.
Expertise in occupational health and safety was made
available to CAA through staff secondment and the
signing of a memorandum of understanding between
the Department of Labour and the CAA. Dedicated
funding was provided to the CAA for HSE Act
administration, so funds would not need to be
diverted from aviation safety administration for the
new policy venture.
The amendment also changed the ‘one act, one
authority’ philosophy recommended in the Robens
Report in 1972, and which had been adopted in New
Zealand. Instead it created a system of multi-agency
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administration of the HSE Act for both general and
specific sectors.
From the perspective of the CAA, it created a ‘one
authority, two act’ system, where the CAA administers
two statutory safety systems established under the Civil
Aviation Act and the HSE Act. Implementing the HSE
Act in this environment is different from ground-based
sectors, where there is no other safety legislation to take
into consideration. The main implementation problems
are to reconcile the differences, overlaps and boundaries
between the two statutes, and the differing philosophies
and practices between aviation safety and occupational
health and safety.
From the perspective of the aviation operators, both a
‘one authority, two act’ and ‘two authorities, one act’
system was created. Aviation employers have two safety
statutes to comply with, with the HSE Act being
administered by two different agencies for ground- and
air-based activities. Problems for the implementing
agencies are centred on the quest for efficient, effective
and error-free delivery of services.
The policy development process therefore solved the
initial policy problem regarding occupational health and
safety coverage for aircrew. The price for this was the
creation of a potentially complex administrative system,
a situation that arguably could not have been avoided,
even if other policy options had been adopted. This
being the case, how can an implementation system such
as this be made to work to achieve the desired policy
outcomes of both a safe civil aviation system and safe
and healthy aircrew?
The solution to implementation is through ‘bottom-
up’ mechanisms such as negotiation. The role of the
implementers, those people described by Lipsky (1980)
as ‘street level bureaucrats’, is to negotiate their way
through the complexity and apparent contradictions,
and end up doing the right thing in order to achieve
the desired outcome. This supports theories of
implementation such as those proposed by Sabatier
(1993) and Lane (1993), which acknowledge both top-
down and bottom-up implementation mechanisms.
The role of implementing officials in
cross-cutting implementation
The role of the officials in implementing cross-cutting
policy solutions such as agency designation includes:
• reconciling conflict and overlap in statutory and
administrative regimes;
• managing stakeholder expectations;
• achieving effectiveness and efficiency in service
delivery;
• managing the risks inherent in the implementation
system; and
• making fair, balanced and unbiased decisions.
Reconciling conflict and overlap in statutory
and administrative systems
One of the difficulties with the implementation of the
HSE Act in the aviation environment was that an aviation
safety system established by the Civil Aviation Act already
existed. The government clearly did not intend the HSE
Act to override the Civil Aviation Act, and neither did it
intend that the HSE Act, as applied to aircrew, remain
unused. The question for the implementer is how to
manage the boundaries, overlaps and potential
contradictions between the two statutory regimes, and
decide when one act or the other should be used.
Conflicts can arise over the application of the different
legal tests in the two acts. It is possible to apply the
HSE Act’s legal test of ‘all practicable steps’ to a situation
covered by a civil aviation rule made under the (now
changed) test of ‘safety at reasonable cost’, and find that
the rule does not meet the same standard. Taking into
account the HSE Act’s ‘non-designation’ clause, the
implementing officials need to decide whether there is
a conflict between the two statutes, and if so, determine
how it can be resolved.
Legislation is also an enabling instrument, and as such
it creates possibilities for dealing with particular issues.
One possibility identified early in the implementation
of the HSE Act in the aviation sector, for which a
guideline is being developed, regarded fatalities in
agricultural aviation. An agricultural aviator died in late
2001 after the load of damp lime he was attempting to
sow became stuck in the aircraft hopper. The lime was
damp due to inadequate protection from the weather
in storage on the farm airstrip.
Under the Civil Aviation Act, the responsibility rests
with the ‘pilot in command’ to refuse to sow the lime if
he or she is not satisfied the situation is safe. This can
mean the aviator loses business if another aviator accepts
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the risk. If the HSE Act is applied, responsibility for
safety can also rest with the farmer requiring the service,
as the farmer has duties as a ‘principal’ under the HSE
Act that he or she did not have under the Civil Aviation
Act. These duties could include ensuring adequate
protection from the elements for bulk materials stored
at the airstrip prior to use. The HSE Act can therefore
be used in a way not possible with the Civil Aviation
Act to deal with what is essentially an aviation safety
issue rather than an occupational health and safety issue.
How far does the implementer go in exploring these
possibilities? If an action is possible under the HSE Act
that does not override the Civil Aviation Act, is it ethical
not to use that provision? At what point, however, is
there a risk of undermining the already established
aviation safety system? This presents a dilemma for the
implementing officials, and some caution is needed.
Reconciling tensions in stakeholder
expectations
Reconciling tensions in stakeholder expectations is
normal business for any government agency. In the labour
market there is tension between the expectations of
employer groups and the expectations of unions of how
a government agency will formulate or implement policy.
In a cross-cutting situation such as agency designation,
the government itself as a stakeholder can create tensions
in what is expected of an agency in terms of policy
outcomes. This is demonstrated by the expectation for
the CAA to implement new processes to achieve health
and safety outcomes while maintaining and improving
the effectiveness of the civil aviation system. While these
tensions can lead to smarter ways of working, which
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government
agencies, they do need to be recognised and managed
by the implementing officials.
Effective and efficient delivery of services
The ‘one act, multiple authorities’ and ‘one authority,
two acts’ situations outlined above have a direct impact
on service delivery. Cross-cutting policy issues are
arguably inherently inefficient to deal with - they do
not fit neatly into a single agency’s service delivery
system, and require the skills, knowledge and networks
of other agencies. The goal of the implementer of cross-
cutting policy is therefore to deliver effective services as
efficiently as possible.
Effectiveness is achieved through skilful interaction and
intervention by the people visiting aviation employers.
Efficiency is dealing with the areas of overlap in the
service delivery systems that bring the right skilful
people to the client.
To improve the efficiency of service delivery, some
analysis has to be made of the different agencies that
have an interest in a workplace, and the contact that
people with differing expertise need to have with the
employer. As we have seen, both the CAA and the
Department of Labour have an interest in an employer
for administering the HSE Act for both ‘aircraft in
operation’ and all other business operations. The CAA
also has an interest in the employer as an aviation
operator under the Civil Aviation Act and rules. This
potentially means three different groups visiting a single
employer at different times, and, in a worst case
scenario, placing contradictory requirements on an
employer. Efficiency can be improved in two ways:
through better coordination and communication
between these groups, and possibly through some
amalgamation of service delivery.
The coordination and communication option is
relatively easy to put in place, both formally through
memoranda of understanding between agencies, and
informally through developing and maintaining well-
functioning internal and external relationships.
Amalgamation of service delivery is harder to achieve.
Within the CAA, some amalgamation of HSE Act and
Civil Aviation Act requirements can be achieved – for
example, in the accident reporting required by both
acts. Quality systems required by the civil aviation rules
can be extended to include HSE Act hazard
management.
CAA auditors could be trained to carry out health and
safety audits during the same visit. Although it is
efficient, and many aviation operators would prefer one
visit from the regulator, it may not be effective, as
aviation safety issues could dominate the visit, leaving
little time for occupational health and safety issues.
Expertise and interest in health and safety issues on the
part of auditors primarily employed to carry out aviation
safety functions may be variable.
Alternatives include training CAA auditors to carry out
‘screening’ HSE audits, and for specialist staff to also
visit clients and carry out fuller inspections. This
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diminishes returns on efficiency and the reduction in
compliance costs for operators, but delivers the service
more effectively.
Redesigning the system to minimise or prevent inter-
agency overlaps is problematic. The Prime Minister’s
designation of the CAA to administer the HSE Act
could be extended so that all activities of an aviator
were administered by the CAA. However, this would
shift the CAA from their core role of aviation safety,
and mean that they would need to administer the HSE
Act for areas removed from their expertise, creating a
significant business risk. They would probably be less
than enthusiastic about such a prospect.
Management risks
Potential areas of risk in the implementation of the HSE
Act for ‘aircraft in operation’ include risks of unintended
consequences, implementation failure and error.
The aviation industry raised concern about the risk
of unintended consequences in the form of a
catastrophic aviation event in the early stage of the
policy formulation process. Aviation safety is based
to a large degree on the philosophy of open reporting
of errors to the regulator and other aviators as a means
of learning about situations that could have led to an
accident. Aviators were concerned that the HSE Act
was inappropriate to regulate aviation, particularly
because of the fear that it would be enforced
aggressively in that environment, would close down
the open reporting system as a consequence, and
ultimately increase the risk of accidents. The notion
of the regulator as a contributor to accidents is
supported by Reason (1997), whose model of accident
causation forms the theoretical basis of air accident
investigation in New Zealand and overseas.
How seriously should an implementer take these
arguments? There is obviously little value in an
implementer vigorously enforcing occupational health
and safety law if it compromises aviation safety culture.
There is also little value in overcompensating for this
risk and achieving nothing in implementing the new
policy. The ideal of course is to achieve both aviation
safety and occupational health and safety, and to
implement the HSE Act in aviation in a way that at
worst is neutral in its effects on aviation safety, and at
best complements and reinforces aviation safety.
The main mechanism for the implementing officials
to find their way through this is to negotiate with both
aviation safety people and other stakeholders to establish
the appropriate standards that can be used if
enforcement is contemplated.
Tied in with this is the risk of error. With cross-
cutting issues, there is an almost complete certainty
that erroneous views or assumptions will be held by
stakeholders, policy actors and implementers at some
stage of the policy formulation or implementation
process. The way in which policy developers and
implementers deal with the risk of error can
determine whether this is a short-lived or persistent
phenomenon.
Reason categorises error into ‘active’ and ‘latent’ failures.
Active failures include skill-based slips and lapses, such
as losing attention and not hearing vital information,
or forgetting to tell someone something important.
Active errors also include mistakes such as the
misapplication of a rule, or making decisions based on
wrong or incomplete information.
Active failures on their own can cause serious
consequences, but are most dangerous when combined
with latent failures. Latent failures are the failures of
the organisation itself rather than the individual people
in it, and can include sustained management failures
such as not building the right capability into an
organisation, or the failures with communication and
learning within an organisation.
An active knowledge-based error could occur in the
form of a health and safety inspector writing an
improvement notice for an issue where the
‘improvement’ violates a civil aviation rule requirement.
Although many aviators would detect this immediately
and would complain, a latent failure would be the
inability of the CAA to correct the knowledge deficit
of the health and safety inspector to ensure that the
mistake would not occur again.
The best defence against error in policy development
or service delivery is having people who are open and
frank in their communication, who are careful with the
assumptions they make, who do not cover up mistakes,
who have good organisational and cross-organisational
awareness and will go the extra mile to open and reopen
communication with regulatory partners and
stakeholders.
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Making fair, balanced and unbiased decisions
As we have seen, implementing officials need to exercise
considerable judgement to arrive at the appropriate
decisions and actions in implementing cross-cutting
policy. What can affect the way those decisions are made?
Organisations such as the CAA have a centre of gravity
created by the work they have carried out over a period
of years, the professional groups within the organisation,
and the norms of professional practice. This creates what
writers such as Halperin (1974) describe as an
organisation’s ‘essence’; that is, the views of the
organisation’s dominant group of its missions and
capabilities, and the expertise, experience and knowledge
necessary for the organisation to fulfil its mission.
A potential dilemma for an organisation such as the
CAA is where people with an aviation background judge
a new policy through the lens of their professional mind-
set. However, this is not a black-and-white issue. The
CAA employs aviation experts precisely for that
background, and the advice these people can give. To
ignore that advice because it disagrees with a policy
direction is foolish.
At the grass-roots level, the designation of the CAA to
administer the HSE Act for aircraft in operation is not
about overlap or conflict in statutory regimes, or the
efficiency or effectiveness of service delivery systems. It
is mostly about two professional paradigms, practices
and the accompanying knowledge sets interacting one
with the other. For any measure of real success to occur
with this type of implementation, both aviation safety
people and occupational health and safety people have
to be able to learn to think inside and outside their
professional ‘world-views’. A mechanism of negotiation
between these world-views is necessary so that if a
decision on implementing the HSE Act is required, all
factors will receive a fair and open hearing.
Good decision making in a cross-cutting policy
environment will therefore draw from both professional
paradigms, and will take legal possibilities, risks,
stakeholder expectations, and desired organisational and
whole-of-government outcomes into account. This
requires skilful performance from implementing
officials. It also provides an evolutionary stimulus for
both professional groups and the organisations they
work for. Perhaps an indicator for the successful
implementation of the HSE Act for aircraft in operation
is the degree to which occupational health and safety
becomes part of the CAA’s essence in the medium term.
Conclusion
The case study of the implementation of the HSE Act
for aircraft in operation shows some of the difficulties
with designing a policy solution for cross-cutting policy
problems. Because of the legislative systems already in
existence, and the location of wells of expertise in
separate agencies, policy solutions such as agency
designation will result in a certain degree of overlap
and conflict between possible legislative requirements
and administrative systems.
This can be resolved by the implementer acting as a
negotiator, where negotiation is needed to resolve legal
overlaps and conflicts, stakeholder expectations, the
balance between effectiveness and efficiency of service
delivery, the management of risks, and the ability to
make fair and balanced decisions. The implementing
officials need to exercise their role with skill and care to
balance these and arrive at the right decisions and
actions to achieve policy outcomes.
Agency designation also provides a stimulus for agency
evolution, in that to fulfil these new roles competently,
the agency needs to adapt to the changing nature of
the work it is required to perform.
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